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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
I. THE AFFIDAVIT OF AVNER KALAY CLEARLY RAISED AN ISSUE OF A
MATERIAL FACT. IF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE CASE SHOULD BE
REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
Paragraph 14 of Avner Kalay's affidavit states that "the fair value of Mr.
Borghetti's shares at the time of the merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706
million." (R. 4645).
The Defendants address that by arguing that the only valid approach to arriving at
the fair value of a dissenter's shares under Deleware 8 Del C. §262, is to "to value the
corporation itself, as distinguished from a fraction of its shares as they may exist in the
hands of a particular shareholder." LeBeau v. M.G. Corp., Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9,
7.
The quote from LeBeau, taken out of context, appears to support the Defendants'
position. However, like the many other cases with similar quotes, in context, the meaning
of the quote is made clear. In LeBeau, the court was determining whether the expert
valuation of Robert Reilly was permissible. The court rule it impermissible on the basis
that "Reilly's capital market valuation method is impermissible because it includes a
built-in minority discount." Id.
Like all other cases discussing the valuation of the companies in Delaware
appraisal actions, the principal expressed is that neither minority interest discounts nor
control interest premiums are allowed in the calculation of the fair value of the shares. To
interpret the quote in accord with Defendant's position would directly contradict the plain
language of the statute which reads "the Court shall determine the fair market value of the
shares..." 8 Del C. §262.
Further, it is clear that Dr. Kalay was valuing the entire company via a
methodology that determines the value of all of the common shares in the company. "The
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value of the common stocks, as described in the fifth column of Table 7 is $46.64 million
and the damages to Mr. Borghetti (including 8% prejudgment interest rate) are $8.6
million. (R. 3247, Exh. C , at 17). He then checks his calculation by adding the common
shares figure he reached to the figure for the preferred shares and arrives at the correct
market value.
The Defendants do not assert, nor could they assert, that Dr. Kalay's opinion
applied either discounts or premiums to any block of the common shares. The expert
report of Avner Kalay (R. 3247, Exh. C), at pages 27 and 28 clearly is valuing 100% of
the equity of the common stocks.
Thus, Dr. Kalay was valuing the entire company and from those calculations
derived the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares. That is precisely the procedure required
under the statute. The fact that in his affidavit he reduced the figure down to only Mr.
Borghetti's proportional share (including interest) simply carried the analysis to its
terminating point: actual damages.

If any of the opinions lack credibility it is both of the Defendants' expert's reports.
They both found the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares to be zero. It simply is not
possible for shares in a going concern with even the slightest possibility of success to be
worth nothing.
There can be no question that Mr. Borghetti's shares had a value. But for the
improper merger, the company had the potential of continued growth and profits. At the
time of the merger the company had $15.1 million in cash and cash equivalents. (R.
3247, Exh. C , at 7). Even had the company continued to lose money (as technology start
up companies often do), it had sufficient capital to continue. Id.
The statutes and the cases recognize the need to protect common shareholders'
interests. The statute states that the appraisal is conducted to determine the fair value of
the dissenter's shares. The cases state that "fundamentally, a Delaware court must
-2-

employ a liberalized approach to valuation embracing "proof of value by any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community." See,
i.e. Weinberger v. UOP. Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).

The appeal on the appraisal issue (as to both groups of Defendants) can be
summarized into two competing views.
First, Mr. Borghetti's position that all shares in an ongoing company have some
value and if they are cancelled in a merger or liquidation the share holder is entitled to be
compensated.
Second, the Defendants' position that if a discounted cash flow analysis or market
analysis shows that the current value of the entire company is less than a preference
amount, the company, its directors, and the controlling shareholder may sell the company
to the controlling shareholder, receive compensation for their decision, pay the rest to the
preferred shareholders (who held two of the three positions on the
"independent"committee that approved the merger) and leave the small common
shareholders with nothing.
The inequity of the second view, that those in control can take something of clear
value without compensation therefor, mandates adoption of the first view. Mr. Borghetti
is entitled to some compensation.
II. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE DISTRICT COURT
TO DENY THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
AVNER KALAY. THERE WAS A MORE THAN SUFFICIENT SHOWING
THAT THE METHODOLOGY IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND RELIABLE.
This Court reviews the denial of the SCT Defendants' motion to strike the expert
testimony of Avner Kalay for an abuse of discretion. InreG.B., 2002 UT 270, ^flO, 53
P.3d963.
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme
Court explicitly broadened the interpretation of the Delaware Corporations Code, section
262 on appraisal rights, and adopted a more liberal approach to the valuation process (Id,
at 704). The Court concluded that an exclusive method for valuation was outmoded and a
more liberal approach to stock valuation and appraisal proceedings must include proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community (Id. at 712). They held that the most popularly employed techniques
for valuation no longer exclusively control appraisal and valuation proceedings, and that
alternative valuation techniques should be allowed. (Id. at 713; See also, Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor Inc. 684 A.2d 289, 296-297 (Del. 1996)). The Court in Weinberger further
concluded that when determining the value that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for
that which has been taken from him, a number of relevant factors are to be included. The
Court stated:
In determining what figure represents [the] true or intrinsic value, the
appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors and
elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus,
market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be
ascertained. . . This is not only in accord with the realities of present day
affairs, but it is thoroughly consonant with the purpose and intent of our
statutory law.
(Id. at 713).
So not only are the valuation methods that are accepted to be liberally construed by
the Courts, but it is the Court's opinion according to Weinberger that all the relevant
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factors shoi lid be inch ided when determining value as well (See Also. Cede_& Co at
295'). Market value is simply a factor to be used and in fact the Black-Scholes method
used by Kalay utilized market value as a factor,
.'
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that are allowed, in Bingham Consolidation. Co v Groesbeck 105 P.3d 365 (Ct.App.
Utah (20041 the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the goal of appraiser is to ascertain the
actual wort!. ^. ^;H which the dissentei loses , , . there are no uxcu methods for valuating

the financial community. (Id. at 370, citing Qakridge Energy Inc. v. Clifton 937 P.2d
130, 132 (Utah 1997), See also, Paskill Corp, v. Alcoma Corp. 7An A.2d 549, 556 (Del.
2000)). They concluded tiiat they are in agreement with other junsdiciions ina . , - • i;
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community." (Bingham at 375, See also, Paskill Corp. at 556).
Kalay's use of the Black-Scholes Model, simply because it is an alternative
method, cannot be excluded because it is clear!) a general!) accepted pi inciple and

1

The Court, in Cede Co, \ I echnicolor. Inc. cited and follow ed VV einbergei few: the

proposition that the CR.''" nust broaden the process for determining fair vah le, and
factors that are not the product of speculation may be considered when
determining value, including the nature of the enterprise (Cede Co, v. Technicolor,
Inc. (!>)%» f<iS4 • \ Jd JN" JM5).
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technique in the financial community. Scholes and Merton shared the 1997 Nobel Prize
in economics for their work on the development of this formula. (Brealey, Richard A.,
and Stuart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus. Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 4th Ed.
New York: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2004, page 651, (excerpt attached to R. 5306,
Exhibit W). The field of finance has developed a variety of option pricing models with
the fundamental ones being the binomial model and the Black-Scholes model option
pricing models. Over time, these models and their extensions have been used in a variety
of evaluative settings (Benaroch, Michel and Robert Kauffman. (1999) "A Case for
Using Real Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology Project
Investments." Information Systems Research, Vol. 10, No.l :70-86, (excerpt attached to
R. 5306, Exhibit X).
The literature on the Black-Scholes model and its uses in the finance community is
overwhelming. It is a formula that has been in use for over 30 years, applicable to a
number of evaluations. It has not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used
to value equity and debt in a company. (See generally, Damodaran, Aswath. Investment
Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset, 2nd Ed. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996, page 828-829).
The Black-Scholes technique is frequently cited and written about as a valuation
method for businesses and technologies based on option theory and the method takes into
account a number of complexities and nuances that affect the value of a company that
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other traditional methods do not. It is a valid method when valuing a firm in distress and
also accounts for a firm's flexibility, and has become a very popular approach to
vaiuauo?.. ;Ncc„ Lyocr. Peter i The Real Options Solution: ringing Iotal vajuc in a nign

Copeland, T., Koller, "I ., Muniii, J. Valuation: Measuring ^ ~ AUug^ing the Value of
Companies. McKinsey & Company. !*•.; New York, NY '994. page 399; See Also,
Damodara:;. . ^ .* .ui: i ne IOSI 01 uisiress: Survival, Truncation RISK and V aluation.
Jam

"•'''!-.--

t

.'

It is clearly a generally accepted, frequently cited and utilized method of valuation
in the financial communis
one i
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" has achieved status in the financial community as being
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expert Grabowski in his expert report of May 3 i, 2006 pointed out this exact contention.
He stated that, "The Black-Scholes option pricing model is widely accepted in the
financial community as a methodology to estimate the price of an option, or derivative
h •.'
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a company under financial distress.'* v^- ->2475 Hx A. Grabowski Report at p. i-r>.
Pursuant to both Delaware and Utah law those formulas and techniques which are
generally accepted in the financial community are now clearl) allowed by the t omts,

Black-Scholes method is widely accepted and utilized in the financial community, not

7

only for the valuing of options but as a valuation technique for equity as well, Professor
Kalay's testimony utilizing this methodology was clearly admissible and the district court
properly denied the Defendants' motion to strike.
The cases relied on by the Defendants in their cross appeal are easily
distinguished. Snyder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 93 T.C. 529 (1989) concerns
the valuation of a company, "Libbyfam," which was organized as a personal holding
company, and its sole asset was 300 shares of common stock in W.L. Gore & Associates,
Inc. ('Gore'), a publicly traded corporation. In that case, decided in 1989, the tax court
rejected the Black-Scholes model because it was being applied to a personal holding
corporation. The shares were wholly owned by the tax payer who then created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of her great-grandchildren and funded it with 1,000 of her
3,951 total shares of common stock in Libbyfam.
Everyone of the articles and books cited by Dr. Kalay in his affidavit to show that
the Black-Scholes method for valuing common stock is generally accepted and reliable
was published long after the tax court decision. With one exception they were all
published at least ten years later.
More importantly, Campus Pipeline had substantially more shareholders than one
woman and her great-grandchildren.

In In re Med Diversified Inc.. 334 B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005), the expert
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whose opinion was found impermissible (Mr. Peltz) specifically testified: "Vm not a
certified valuation expert, and I don't issue valuation reports." Further, as to his opinion
applying the Black-Scholes Method for valuing a six and a half month "option" for
acquiring 100% of the privately held shares of Addus, the court stated it was "not
prepared to embark on a cruise down this unexplored river in the heart of the jungle in
order to discover the application of this Method outside the principal context in which it
has been customarily applied." and "The Black-Scholes Method has simply not been
shown to provide a reliable measure of the value of an option to purchase 100% of
controlled shares in a privately held company and the parties failed to set forth any
credible evidence otherwise."
In this case, the Plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence that the Black-Scholes
Method was used to value shares in financially stressed companies like Campus Pipeline.
(R. 4645 at 7-15). Unlike Mr. Peltz, Dr. Kalay has extensive credentials.2
2

Avner Kalay is a professor at the David Eccles School of Business at the University of

Utah where he teaches courses in valuation. He received his B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv
University, a Masters in Business Administration from the University of Rochester and a PhD in
Business Administration from the University of Rochester. Professor Kalay was a professor of
finance at Tel Aviv University and was a member of NYU's business school faculty and was
tenured at NYU in 1985; NYU'sfinancedepartment has been consistently ranked among the top
5 in the world. Professor Kalay has published numerous articles in leadingfinancejournals and
Kalay formerly worked as a consultant for the SEC. (R. 4645)
-9-

The case In re Apple Computer. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 243 F.Supp. 2d 1012, 1028 (N.D.
Cal. 2002), stands for the sole proposition that a Black-Scholes analysis can not be used
to explain the selling patterns of insiders, and thereby show scienter in a securities fraud
case. It has no relevance to this litigation. Neither do the cases applying Black-Scholes
to child support or the significance of a benefit achieved at settlement for use in setting
the size of the attorneys fees awarded.
In Orban v. Field. 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997), the preferred shareholders
had a contractual right to vote for a liquidation. Here the preferred shareholders never
contracted for such rights. This is critical, since the rights of preferred stock are largely
contractual in nature and ordinarily courts should enforce the terms of the contract, not
invent new ones for which the parties did not bargain. HB Korenvaes Investments. L.P.
v. Marriott Corporation. 1993 WL 257422 (Del.Ch. 1993). In Orban the common
shareholder that later objected to the sale (Orban), had agreed that the company needed to
either be sold or that it needed to obtain additional capital. Here the company had
sufficient money to last years before it would have ever run out of money. In Orban. the
board hired an independent investment banking firm to assist it in finding a purchaser or
financing. Here, the board hired no one to attempt find another purchaser or additional
financing - the interested board members performed all of these tasks themselves. In
Orban. there was never any evidence that the fair value was not had and no one claimed
that the sale was not in the best interest of the corporation. In Orban. the acts were
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approved by a fully informed majority of disinterested directors.
Thus, the Defendants cite to several cases off point to discredit the use of BlackScholes in this context. In support of Dr. Kalay's opinion, the Plaintiffs' provided over 8
pages of citations supporting of the use of Black-Scholes in this context. The test is
general acceptance in the financial field and not general acceptance by other courts in
other contexts.
Given the overwhelming evidence submitted of general acceptance and reliability,
and the agreement of the Defendants' expert that "The Black-Scholes option pricing
m o d e l . . . may be used in certain instances to provide the value of the equity of a
company under financial distress," (R. 1982, Ex. W, Grabowski Report, p. 14), the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the SCT Defendants' motion to strike the
testimony of Dr. Kalay.

Even if this Court were to strike the affidavit and report of Dr. Kalay, it is clear
that the Plaintiffs are still entitled to a trial on all of their claims. The cases the
Defendants cite relate primarily to appraisal actions. Even in an appraisal action, the
Delaware court specifically stated that "if neither party adduces evidence sufficient to
satisfy this burden (proving fair value of the shares), "the court must then use its own
independent judgment to determine fair value." Highfields Capital Ltd. v. AXA Fin..
Inc.. 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, 19-20.
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On the other causes of action the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs are the value
of their shares on the date of the merger, plus interest.
The simple fact that the Plaintiffs owned stock which clearly had a monetary value
and that the SCT defendants cancelled that stock shows damages.
III. THE PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY RAISED ISSUES OF FACT ON THE
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS.
In their brief the SCT Defendants assert that they were entitled to summary judgment
based upon the entire fairness of the transaction. This issue was extensively briefed below
in a 42 page memorandum and 125 pages of contested facts. (R. 4576, R. 4290). The
arguments on appeal have not changed.
American corporate law in every state imposes on corporate directors and officers a
duty of loyalty and a duty of care. In Delaware, these duties are a matter of common law.
As fiduciary for the corporation, the board of directors owes a duty of undivided loyalty to
the corporation at all times. Directors and officers must "act loyally and in good faith
without assuming any position in conflict with the interests of the corporation." Bergeson v.
Life Insurance Corporation of America. 265 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Cir. 1959). This Court has
stated,
"There is no doubt that one who is elected as an officer or director of
a corporation accepts a fiduciary responsibility to serve the interests of
those who elect him which he must discharge with fidelity and which
he should not desert for his own gain."
Cox v. Berry. 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P. 2d 575 (1967).
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In the context of a proposed sale of the corporation, the content of the duty of loyalty
becomes clear and mandatory. In the seminal case, Revlon. Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.. 506 A. 2d 173 (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held that when the sale
of the company becomes inevitable, the sole duty of the directors is to maximize the value
that the shares will receive in the sale transaction.
In their brief the SCT Defendants argue that there was no evidence of an unfair price
and no evidence of unfair dealing. The price Mr. Borghetti received, zero, as set forth above
was clearly unfair.
As to unfair dealing the record is replete with instances of the unfairness.
The Campus Pipeline directors had extensive economic interests in the transaction that
were at odds with those of the corporation and its shares.
The financial interests of the officers and directors in endorsing the transaction,
regardless of its merits, are obvious:
a.

Thomas Lewis served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief
Executive Officer of CPI. He received an executive retention payment of
approximately $736,550 in addition to a $787,500 termination fee in
connection with the merger.

b.

Darin Gilson served as President, Chief Operating Officer and Director of CPI,
and he received a retention bonus of approximately $834,756 in connection
with the merger.

c.

Fred Harman was a director of CPI and a member of the "special committee" that
recommended the merger. Harman received compensation in connection with the
merger. Harman was also a managing partner at Oak Investment Partners, which was
a preferred shareholder of Campus Pipeline, with interests in direct conflict to those
of the common stock.
-13-

David Peterschmidt was a director of CPI and a member of the "special
committee" that recommended the merger. Peterschmidt received
compensation in connection with the merger. Peterschmidt was also a
preferred shareholder of Campus Pipeline, with interests in direct conflict to
those of the common stock.
David Gardner was a director of CPI and a member of the "special committee"
that recommended the merger. Although he was not an employee of Campus
Pipeline at the time of the merger, he received retention bonuses of
approximately $137,489 in connection with the merger.
Chad Muir was a director of CPI. Although he was not an employee of
Campus Pipeline at the time of the merger, he received retention bonuses of
approximately $137,489 in connection with the merger.
Eric Haskell was a director of CPI and received compensation in connection
with the merger.
Michael Chamberlain was a director of CPI and received compensation in
connection with the merger.
Allen Friedman was a director of CPI and received compensation in
connection with the merger.
Darin Gilson served as President, Chief Operating Officer and Director of
CPI, and he received a retention bonus of approximately $834,756 in
connection with the merger.
David Murray served as Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of
CPI. Murray received severance payments of approximately $117,848 in
connection with the merger.
Andy Cooley served as Senior Vice President of CPI, and received a
retention bonus of approximately $491,033 in connection with the merger.
In addition, Cooley was later employed by SCT following the merger.
Scott Doughman served as Vice President of Strategy and Corporate
Development of CPI, and received a retention bonus of approximately
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$491,033 in connection with the merger. In addition, Doughman was later
employed by SCT following the merger.
n.

John Dunn served as Vice President of CPI, and received a retention bonus
of approximately $491,033 in connection with the merger.

o.

Tyler Thatcher served as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of CPI,
and received a retention bonus of approximately $491,033 in connection
with the merger.
(R. 4576, p. 14-17)
Given the extensive conflicting interests of the Campus Pipeline directors and
officers, they had a special obligation to be fully informed themselves, and to fully inform
the common shareholders, as to the merits of the transaction. Smith v. Van Gorkum. 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). This duty they did not meet.
The only "outside" opinion they commissioned was from Thomas Weisel Partners
- which was not an outsider at all. Thomas Weisel Partners was a preferred shareholder
of Campus Pipeline and therefore had a strong conflict of interest with the Campus
Pipeline common stock: As a preferred shareholder, Thomas Weisel Partners stood to
lose if Campus Pipeline were to pursue a risky, entrepreneurial course of action and
failed, while if Campus Pipeline were to succeed, the bulk of the upside would go to the
common stock. (R. 4576 17-18; R. 4290, at Tf491, 492). Moreover, just in case this
conflict of interest was not enough to skew Thomas Weisel Partners' judgment, the
Campus Pipeline fiduciaries saw fit to give Thomas Weisel Partners yet another conflict
of interest: they made Thomas Weisel Partners' fee partially contingent on the
completion of the merger. (Id.).
-15-

Moreover, even if Thomas Weisel Partners could have overcome the inherent
conflict of interest in its evaluation of the transaction, the terms of its engagement
precluded it from doing so. The directors directed Thomas Weisel Partners to ignore the
only relevant question: whether the transaction was fair and advantageous to Campus
Pipeline's common stock. The answer to this question is obvious: the transaction
provided no benefit to the common stock and therefore could not have been in their
interest so long as any shred of hope of continuing the business remained. Thomas
Weisel Partners, however, did not consider this issue. Accordingly, its opinion is
worthless. (R. 4290, at ^429-432).
In short, Thomas Weisel Partners' advice to the board was not the result of an
independent evaluation (even by a conflicted advisor) but rather was determined entirely
by the terms of its assignment.
The deposition testimony of defendants Harman and Doughman, as well as the
terms of the assignment to Thomas Weisel Partners, make clear that the directors ignored
their duty of loyalty to act solely in the interests of the common stock. Thus, director
Harman testified:
a.

"We were working on behalf of the entire shareholder group, not just one
class, common or preferred." (R. 3957 at HH, 71).

b.

The board was working to get best value for "the company" rather than the
common stock. (R. 3957 at HH, 62)

c.

He had a duty to all stakeholders not only the common stock. (R. 3957 at
HH, 168)
-16-

d.

He sought to "balance" the interests of different stakeholders, not simply to
promote the interests of the common stock. (R. 3957 at HH, 171).

His duty, however, was to work for common shareholders alone. Harman was
aware that the proposed transaction would wipe out the value of the common stock. {Id.,
at pp. 71, 185). In light of the conflict of interest between common stock and other
investors, his decision to pursue this transaction because it was in the interests of other
stakeholders is a clear, intentional, violation of the Revlon rule.
Had the directors been working in the interests of the common shareholders, they
would have considered and adopted alternative courses of action, any of which would
have been preferable to common shareholders to sale to SCT, which merely ensured that
they would receive the worst possible outcome, a certain payment of zero.
Thus, Harman testified that Campus Pipeline had enough cash to last for another
year. (R. 3957 at HH, 68). From the perspective of the common stock, continuing to
operate the company would have allowed for search for alternative sources of cash,
including increased sale or an alternative investor, thus keeping open the possibility of a
return on their investment. Harman, however, testified that the board was not looking for
more cash at that time. (R. 3957 at HH, 68, 87). Doughman testified that Campus
Pipeline had only to lay off twenty employees to become profitable and that after making
those layoffs the company was indeed breaking even. (R. 3572 at CC, 39-40). Moreover,
the Campus Pipeline business was on an "upward trajectory". (R. 3957 at HH, 114-15).
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The clear interest of the common stock, then, would have been to continue the
business, not to sell for no value.
Similarly, a board interested in pursuing the interests of the common stock would
have pursued alternative transactions that might have provided value to the Campus
Pipeline common stock. Harman also admits the possibility of an alternative transaction,
with Oak Partners, that was not pursued. (R. 3957 at HH, 76).
Revlon and its progeny in Delaware and elsewhere make clear that once a board
has decided that the sale of the company is inevitable, its sole duty is to maximize the
return to the common shareholders. The facts asserted in opposition to the motions for
summary judgment demonstrate that the Campus Pipeline directors and officers viewed
their job differently. Harman explicitly stated, and their actions clearly demonstrate, that
they viewed their obligations as, at most, to "balance" the interests of different Campus
Pipeline constituencies, including its customer SCT and, most importantly, themselves.
In this case, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs asserted facts showing that the
directors failed to consider alternative transactions, failed to exercise their business
judgment in the interests of the common stock, and specifically instructed their outside
consultant, Thomas Weisel Partners, to assume the very result it needed to consider,
namely whether the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT was the best available course of
action from the perspective of Campus Pipeline's common stock. The directors and
officers sold Campus Pipeline to SCT in a transaction from which they benefitted but
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which gave no value whatsoever to the common stock. It was hardly an arms-length
transaction arrived at through fair dealing for a fair price.
The cases cited are easily distinguished. In the unpublished decision of Blackmore
Partners. L.P. v. Link Energy, LLC. 2005 WL 2709639 (Del.Ch. 2005), the corporation
had just emerged from bankruptcy. Here there is no evidence that the company was
anywhere near bankruptcy and had millions of dollars of cash on hand. Link, before
selling itself, first sold non strategic assets in order to stay in business. Here, there is no
evidence of any attempt to sell assets or obtain financing or do anything else prior to sale,
because, of course, Campus Pipeline had millions in the bank at the time of sale. Link
hired independent outside advisors to assist it in finding capital. Link's special committee
was clearly independent. It was undisputed that Link was insolvent at all relevant times,
unlike Campus Pipeline. The Link corporate charter did not entitle the common
shareholders (unit holders) to vote on the sale of substantially all of Link's assets - here
different voting rules applied. In Link business prospects were declining, but Campus
Pipeline's prospects were on the rise. In Link, the board of directors owed a fiduciary
duty to the note-holders because of insolvency — no such duty was owed here, indeed, the
board's paramount duty was to the common shareholders.
IV. THE ATTORNEYS CONTENTION THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE AN
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS DISPUTED BY NUMEROUS FACTS
As was extensively briefed below, (R. 4608-4627) whether Bendinger Crockett
and Mr. Borghetti had an attorney client relationship is a question of fact for the jury.
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In Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001), this Court was faced
with whether an implied attorney-client relationship had been established between the members
and the counsel for the company. The Court stated:
[T]he proper determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship
exists hinges on whether the party had a reasonable belief that it was represented.
.. in making the determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship
existed, one factor to consider is the attorney's direct involvement in the party's
legal interests
(Id. at 1139-1140)
In Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002), this Court stated that, "in order for a
person to reasonably believe that an attorney represents the person, (1) the person must
subjectively believe the attorney represents him or her and (2) this subjective belief must be
reasonable under the circumstances." (Id. at 1124, internal citations omitted).
Here, there is no doubt that "advice" and "assistance" were "both sought and received".
In the Plaintiffs' Statement of Disputed and Additional Facts (R. 4290), the relationship
between Jeffery Williams and Mr. Borghetti is detailed in paragraphs 156-190. In those
pargraphs Mr. Borghetti identifies numerous meetings, emails, telephone calls and face to face
meetings during which Mr. Williams and Mr. Borghetti discussed the possible claims, including
appraisals, the potential for damages, the fee arrangement possibilities, Delaware law, the
business judgment rule, and a multitude of other related topics. In addition, Mr. Williams told
Mr. Borghetti he wanted to hire an expert to value the claim (167); told Mr. Borghetti to write a
letter to SCT demanding appraisal rights for the shares (168); told Mr. Borghetti that the fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty claims were better than an appraisal (171); and he requested and
received Mr. Borghetti's original and only copy of the documents necessary to pursue the claims
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(178). Mr. Borghetti believed he had an attorney client relationship with Mr. Williams and his
firm. (198). Only after the statute of limitations had passed by months did Mr. Williams send
Mr. Borghetti a letter stating he was not going to pursue the case. (189).
Despite months of discussions, the hiring of valuation experts, the discussion of fee
arrangements, the taking of possession of the only copy of the file and its retention until after the
statute of limitations passed, the Bendinger Crockett Defendants assert no attorney client
relationship existed. There was clearly as issue of fact for the jury and there is no basis for
affirming dismissal on any other ground.
There are facts in dispute as to whether Borghetti had the legal sophistication to
understand how to file when to file or perfect his appraisal. In paragraphs 201 through 220
demonstrate that Mr. Borghetti believed that Mr. Williams was his lawyer and that Mr. Williams
was staying on top of the entire case including any appraisal action. The facts alleged also
dispute the contention that Mr. Borghetti knew he had 120 days to file.
The Defendants' contention that Mr. Parson's told Mr. Borghetti of the deadline does not
relieve them of the duty to file. More importantly, the fact is disputed. In paragraph 187, it is
clear that Mr. Borghetti was not relying on Mr. Parsons and had ceased seeking attorneys other
than Mr. Williams. Further, Mr. Parson's told Borghetti that he was not a litigator, had no
litigation experience, and was unfamiliar with Delaware law.
CONCLUSION
The Court below erred in simply looking at Professor Kalay's calculation of
market value and holding such figures to be the "end all, be all" in this action. Instead,
the Court below should have focused on the "fair value" damage calculation from
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Professor Kalay. The denial of the motion to strike the affidavit of Dr. Kalay was not an
abuse of discretion. The damages calculation is equally applicable to the other causes of
action. That fair value damage calculation clearly and undoubtedly shows that Plaintiffs
suffered damages of between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. Respectfully, the
Appellants request that both Summary Judgment Orders and Judgments be vacated and
reversed and the case remanded for trial below.
Dated this t ?

day of February, 2008

Curtis L. Wenger,
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Salt Lake County, Utah.
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My
business address is City Centre I, 175 East 400 South, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of
correspondence for mailing with the United States' Postal Service, Federal Express and
hand delivery. On August 12, 2004,1 placed for delivery via U.S. Mail two true and
correct copies of the within document, APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF in a sealed
envelope, to the following:

John iJearce
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stuart Schultz
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
And, one original and nine copies of APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were
served,
[ ] via United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to:
[ ] via hand delivery
to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
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I declare that I am employed in the office of an attorney that has been
admitted to this Court at whose direction the service was made.
Executed on February 5, 2008at Salt Lake City, Utah.
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